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I.

INTRODUCTION

In most Western legal systems, a party who prevails in litigation is generally entitled t o
indemnification from the losing party for at least part of his or her economic costs of
prosecuting the lawsuit. The amount of litigation expenditures that can be recovered,
however, varies substantially both among and within individual regimes. In the United States,
the predominant rule awards a prevailing litigant what are officially termed ÒcostsÓ Ñ
typically defined by statute to include filing fees, court reporter charges, printing, copying,
and witness fees, and the like Ñ but does not entitle him or her to recover expenditures on
attorneysÕ fees, which are of far greater magnitude in the usual case. Consequently, U.S.
litigants can bear significant expense even when they are ultimately vindicated on the merits.
In the other commonÐlaw countries, in contrast, and indeed in most of the rest of the
Western world, winning litigants are entitled to recover attorneysÕ fees as well as other outÐ
ofÐpocket costs of litigation. As a result, they come closer to being made whole than do
winning litigants in the U.S.
The substantial increase in expenditures on litigation and dispute resolution in the United States in
recent years has led both policymakers and scholars to advocate a variety of substantive and
procedural reforms in the legal system. The rules for allocating attorneysÕ fees in civil
litigation have drawn particular attention in this regard, with a number of influential
commentators recommending a move in the direction of fuller indemnification Ñ or what in
the U.S. is usually called, for historical reasons, the ÒEnglishÓ or ÒBritishÓ rule. Such
recommendations have begun to have influence on both public and private lawmakers; indeed,
one of the more prominent and widely supported provisions in the Republican PartyÕs 1994
ÒContract with AmericaÓ platform would have adopted a modified form of the English rule
for federal cases brought under the diversity jurisdiction. But the political debate over
litigation costs in the U.S does not seem to have assimilated the main lesson of the economic
literature on the topic Ñ that the effects of cost shifting on the amount and intensity of
litigation
are
substantially

more complicated than a superficial consideration of the matter might suggest. Indeed, the
current state of economic knowledge does not enable us reliably to predict whether a move t o
fuller indemnification would raise or lower the total costs of litigation, let alone whether it
would better align those costs with any social benefits they might generate.
The reason for this agnostic conclusion is straightforward. Legal costs influence all aspects of the
litigation process, from the decision to file suit to the choice between settlement and trial t o
the question whether to take precautions against a dispute in the first place (for a survey of
such effects, see Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989). Furthermore, as Shavell (1982b) has shown,
an individual litigantÕs incentives to bring suit in a costly legal system do not generally
conform to the social optimum; and the divergence between private and social incentives t o
sue are complex. A plaintiffÕs decision to sue imposes an obvious cost on the defendant and
on the taxpayers who foot the bill for public legal institutions. Less obviously, it affects
litigants in other cases by crowding the courts, by delaying the resolution of other disputes in
the system, and, through informational externalities, by altering the expected costs of
settlement. It also affects future litigants by increasing the stock of legal precedent, and
potential litigants (as well as those who never intend to resort to the courts at all) by
influencing the perceived likelihood of sanctions for violating substantive legal duties.
Similarly, the decisions to pursue a lawsuit to trial rather than settling, and to litigate more
rather than less intensively, generate analogous external costs and benefits. The combination
of all these external effects are too complicated to be remedied by a simple rule of Òloser
pays.Ó Instead, indemnity of legal fees remedies some externalities while failing to address
and even exacerbating others.
This article, accordingly, surveys the effects of legal fee shifting on a variety of decisions arising
before and during the litigation process. Section 2 provides a brief survey of the practical
situations in which legal fee shifting does and does not arise. Section 3 analyzes the effects of
indemnification on the incentives to expend resources in litigated cases. Section 4 examines
how indemnification influences the decisions to bring and to defend against suit, and Section 5
assesses its effects on the choice between settlement and trial. Section 6 addresses the
interaction between the allocation of legal fees and the partiesÕ incentives for efficient
primary behavior. Section 7 considers two important variants on simple indemnification:
rules that shift costs based on the partiesÕ settlement negotiations (such as U.S. Federal Rule
68 and the English practice of payment into court), and rules that shift costs based on the
margin of victory (such as U.S. Federal Rule 11 and the commonÐlaw tort of malicious
prosecution). Section 8 reviews the brief but instructive empirical literature on legal cost
shifting, and section 9 summarizes the discussion and offers conclusions.
[N.B.: The scholarly literature on fee shifting has flourished in recent years, to the point where it
is no longer feasible to discuss every pertinent contribution. For recent surveys of work in

the area, see Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989), Anderson (1996), and the symposia appearing in

Law and Contemporary Problems (1984) and ChicagoÐKent Law Review (1996)
respectively.]

I.

THE PRACTICAL EXTENT OF LEGAL FEE SHIFTING

This article does not attempt to survey the law governing fee shifting, either in the U.S. or
elsewhere. For such surveys, see Pfennigstorf (1984), Note (1984), or Tomkins and Willging
(1986). It should be recognized, however, that there are significant areas of U.S. legal
practice that do not follow the traditional American rule. Most important among these are
the various federal and state statutes that entitle a successful plaintiff, though not a successful
defendant, to courtÐawarded attorneysÕ fees as part of a recovery. Similar ÒoneÐwayÓ fee
shifting policies have also been established in both federal and state courts through a
combination of statutory interpretation and common law development, though the scope for
such interpretations at the federal level was substantially limited by the Supreme Court in

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Such
provisions and policies, which make up a central part of litigation practice in such fields
as civil rights, consumer, and antitrust law, have only some of the effects of the traditional
twoÐway English rule. Second, both federal and state courts have authority to award
indemnification to parties who are victimized by abuse of process, though such authority
is typically exercised only in response to egregious behavior. Examples include the
provisions in Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 11 dealing with frivolous or improper pleadings, and
those in Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 37. relating to discovery abuse. U.S. practice also provides
litigants with an "offerÐofÐjudgment" procedure under which a defendant can make a
settlement offer to the plaintiff which, if rejected and filed with the court, creates a trigger
for partial indemnification. Both of these specialized types of provisions Ñ sanctions
for abuse and offers of judgment Ñ are discussed separately in section 7 below.
Conversely, even in jurisdictions following the majority or ÒEnglishÓ rule, indemnification for
legal costs is substantially less than complete. CourtÐawarded attorneysÕ fees obviously do
not compensate for the nonmonetary and psychic costs of litigation. Even the monetary
amounts awarded, furthermore, are limited by the judgeÕs view of what expenditures are
reasonable and, in some jurisdictions (e.g., British Columbia), by statutory schedule. Such
judicial and statutory caps can and often do hold fee awards below the going market rate for
legal representation, forcing winning litigants to pay the difference out of anticipated
recoveries or their own pockets (indeed, Leubsdorf (1984) presents evidence that such courtÐ
imposed price ceilings were responsible for the historical development of the American rule
in the first place.) Accordingly, the pure ÒEnglishÓand ÒAmericanÓ rules discussed below

should be understood as ideal polar cases, and the differences among actual jurisdictional
practices as ones of degree along a spectrum ranging from lesser to greater indemnification .
Additionally, Donohue (1991b) points out that the American rule is a default rule rather than a
mandatory one, in that parties are generally free to provide for indemnification through
private contract Ñ either at the time they begin their litigation or, for those disputes arising
out of an consensual relationship, in their original agreement. He presents anecdotal
evidence that such ex ante indemnification terms are widespread, though the provisions he

cites seem primarily to be drawn from standardized form contracts and tend to operate
asymmetrically in favor of the drafting party: for instance, apartment leases that
indemnify landlords but not tenants for attorneysÕ fees in the event of a dispute over
unpaid rent. The scope for fee shifting in the U.S,. therefore, may be significantly greater
than is ordinarily supposed. Conversely, there is no apparent bar in England or in the
other jurisdictions following the English rule to a partial settlement or stipulation in which
the litigants agree in advance to give up their rights to indemnification ex post. DonohueÕs
further conjectures that such contractual terms are likely to be efficiencyÐenhancing and
that the pattern of such terms will help reveal whether the English or American rule is
more efficient, however, are more problematic. To the extent that indemnification is
provided by a oneÐsided standardized term, there is no guarantee that it promotes the
joint interests of the parties. The nondrafting party may fail to notice the indemnification
provision at all; and if he does notice it, he may avoid raising it as an issue for fear of
revealing himself as someone who anticipates a dispute. Even when such agreements arise
out of armsÐlength bargaining, furthermore, this does not imply that they are efficient. As
Bernstein (1993) and Shavell (1995) have observed in their respective analyses of
alternative dispute resolution, because of the divergence of private and social incentives in
litigation, the fact that a particular agreement is in the litigantsÕ ex post interest does not
necessarily mean that it is socially efficient. The fact that the parties have come to
litigation in the first place, moreover, casts doubt on the presumption that they are
bargaining in a Coasian fashion.

I.

THE EFFECT OF FEE SHIFTING ON TRIAL AND PRETRIAL EXPENDITURES

The standard economic theory of litigation, as developed by Landes (1971), Posner (1972), and
Gould (1973), models litigating parties as rational actors who seek to maximize their returns
from the litigation process. From this perspective, amounts spent on trial preparation can be
seen as a type of private investment. An additional hour of legal research or argumentation
is profitable, on this view, only if the marginal return, measured by the change in the
expected outcome of trial or settlement, outweighs the cost of the attorneyÕs time.
Plaintiffs, accordingly, will choose to spend legal resources up to the point where their

expected recoveries, net of expenses, are maximized; defendants will act so as to minimize
total payouts. The precise outcome of this contest depends on how the parties react and
adjust to each othersÕ decisions. One simple and natural assumption is that the litigants reach
a Nash equilibrium in expenditure; that is, that each takes the otherÕs expenditure as given
when choosing his own. Whatever the nature of the partiesÕ strategic interaction, however,
the partiesÕ expenditures are determined in equilibrium by a host of economic and
technological factors including the stakes of the case, the marginal cost of legal resources,
and the sensitivity of trial outcomes to the partiesÕ individual efforts. In highÐstakes cases in
which the outcome is heavily dependent on the partiesÕ work product, expenditures will be
high; in petty cases where the outcome is largely predetermined by legal precedent,
expenditures will be low.
As Braeutigam, Owen and Panzar (1984) first proved and Katz (1987) subsequently explained, it
follows from the standard model that fee shifting encourages greater expenditure in litigated
cases. The reasons are twofold. First, fee shifting increases the stakes of the case by making
legal expenditures part of the potential damages. Second, it lowers the expected marginal
cost of legal expenditure. Each party, when deciding whether to purchase an additional unit
of legal services, will discount its cost by the probability with which she expects to win and t o
be reimbursed by her opponent. More formally: if we let p denote the probability of

liability, A the amount awarded if the plaintiff wins, and x and y the amounts spent by the
plaintiff and defendant respectively, then under the American rule a plaintiff will expect
to recover p(x, y) A(x, y) Ð x. Assuming riskÐneutrality for the sake of simplicity, it
follows she will choose x to satisfy the firstÐorderÐcondition, px A + pA x = 1. The
defendant, conversely, expects to pay out pA + y, and will select y to satisfy his firstÐ
orderÐcondition, py A + pA y = Ð1. Under the English rule, in contrast, the plaintiffÕs
expected recovery is pA Ð (1Ðp)(x+y); so her firstÐorderÐcondition is px(A+x+y) + pA x =
1Ðp. Similarly, the defendantÕs expected payout is p(A+x+y), and his firstÐorderÐ
condition is py(A+x+y) + pAy = Ðp. In all of these equations, the leftÐhand side represents
the marginal private benefit of expenditure, and the rightÐhand side its marginal cost.
Inspection of the equations reveals that the marginal private cost of legal expenditure is
lower for both parties under the English rule. If the partiesÕ expenditure affects the
probability of liability (that is, if px and py are positive), the marginal private benefit is
also higher; if expenditure affects the amount awarded rather than the probability of
liability, marginal benefit is unchanged. Other things being equal, therefore, the English
rule makes expenditure more attractive.
It should be noted that the marginalÐcost effect depends not on the actual probability of liability,
but on its perceived probability. It follows that the increase in expenditure under the English
rule will be greater the more optimistic are the litigants. In the extreme, parties who regard
themselves as very likely to win will perceive litigation as virtually costless and will increase
their expenditures accordingly. To the extent that such efforts increase the probability of

prevailing, therefore, such optimism will be partially selfÐfulfilling. Similarly, in other than
even cases, the marginalÐcost effect will be stronger for the party with the stronger
probability of prevailing ex ante. For instance, if both parties regard the initial probability

of liability as 90%, the plaintiff will discount the expected marginal cost of legal services
to 10¢ on the dollar while the defendant discounts it only to 90¢. The stimulus to the
plaintiffÕs expenditure will accordingly be ten times greater than the stimulus to the
defendantÕs. Fee shifting, accordingly, reinforces the advantages of the party who is
initially favored in litigation.
Because of the interaction between the partiesÕ expenditure decisions, it is not possible to prove
that both sides will increase their expenditures under the English rule. The reason for this
ambiguity is that a marginal increase in one sideÕs expenditure has an ambiguous effect on the
otherÕs; it could either provoke the opponent to respond in kind, or intimidate him into
reducing his own efforts. Braeutigam, Owen and Panzar, however, showed that in Nash
equilibrium the sum of the partiesÕ expenditures must increase. The extent of the increase
depends on how sensitive p and A are to litigation expenditure, as Plott (1987) has

demonstrated. Using a Nash equilibrium model and making some simplifying technical
assumptions regarding functional form, he found that if the case outcome depends entirely
on factors out of the litigantsÕ control, the English rule has no effect on expenditure. If
case outcome is determined solely by their efforts, conversely, the English rule will cause
expenditure to increase without limit.
Such effects are mitigated in regimes that limit the amount of fees that can be shifted. For
example, under both English and U.S. practice, indemnification is limited to reasonable
expenditures. Similarly, some recent U.S proposals provide that a losing party need not pay
any indemnification in excess of his or her own litigation costs. Both of these variations
reduce the private benefits of legal expenditure relative to the pure English rule; and as
Hughes and Woglom (1996) show, the latter actually operates as a tax on the weaker partyÕs
expenditure, since increases in his spending raise the cap on the indemnification potentially
payable to his opponent.
Furthermore, while most of the economic literature on litigation expenditure has assumed a Nash
equilibrium, a few authors [e.g., Hersch (1990)] have argued that it is not reasonable t o
expect litigants to ignore the effect on the other sideÕs expenditure when choosing their own.
The Nash specification is most appealing when expenditure is simultaneous, when each side
must choose how much to spend before learning the opponentÕs decision, or when the
expenditure decision is largely determined by oneÕs initial choice of an attorney; it is least
appealing when one side can commit to a given level of expenditure and communicate that
commitment to the opponent in advance. One can analyze the latter situation using the
more general model of conjectural variations Ñ so called because it allows a partyÕs decision

to depend upon his conjectures regarding how the opponentÕs decision varies with his own.
Formally, let vx denote the rate at which the plaintiff expects the defendant to respond to

her expenditures. This rate could be positive (in which case expenditure would be
provocative), negative (in which case expenditure would be intimidating), or zero (as in
the Nash model). The plaintiffÕs firstÐorderÐcondition then becomes (px + vx py)A + p (A
x+ vx A y) = 1 under the American rule, and (px + vx py)(A + x + y) + p (A x+ v x A y) = (1Ð
p)(1+vx) under the English rule. (The analysis for the defendant is symmetric and is
omitted for the sake of brevity.) Comparing the first term of each equations, one can see
that the stakes effect is still present. The direction of the marginalÐcost effect, however,
is now ambiguous. Under the English rule, an additional dollar spent on legal services will
cost the plaintiff only 1Ðp, after she discounts for the probability of prevailing. But if the
plaintiff loses, she will also have to pay the defendantÕs costs, and the additional dollar
induces him to change his expenditures by v x. If the plaintiffÕs expenditure is
intimidating, this will lower her marginal cost even further. If her expenditure is
sufficiently provocative, however, her marginal cost of legal resources will rise; if it is
provocative enough to outweigh the stakes effect, her equilibrium expenditure will fall.
It is difficult to judge the empirical importance of the conjecturalÐvariations model. Katz (1988)
has shown that in the typical case one party is in a provocative position and the other in an
intimidating one. In particular situations, however, expenditure may be very provocative.
One such context may be civil discovery, the process through which U.S. litigants are
permitted to request information from their adversaries before trial. Expenditures on
discovery have risen substantially in recent decades, and it has been widely alleged that much
of this increase is an abuse of the system, encouraging both frivolous suits and unfair
settlements. The underlying problem, however, may simply be one of incentives. As Cooter
and Rubinfeld (1994, 1995) and Cooper (1994) explain, a party seeking discovery can under
current American practice impose significant costs on her adversary at relatively low cost t o
herself Ñ for instance, by issuing a formulaic though burdensome list of interrogatories and
document requests, or by resisting requests that could be complied with cheaply. For such
types of expenditure, the conjectural variation v x is very large; fee shifting, accordingly,

may substantially deter ÒabusiveÓ behavior of this sort.
The analysis in this section has focused on the amount of resources expended in litigated cases.
Total expenditures on litigation, however, are the product of two factors: expenditures per
litigated case, and the number of cases that are actually litigated. Fee shifting can influence
the number of litigated cases in two ways: by influencing the decision to bring the dispute t o
court in the first place, and by influencing the partiesÕ incentive to settle cases before trial.
The next section of this article discusses the former effect, and section 5 discusses the latter.

I.

EFFECTS OF FEE SHIFTING ON THE DECISIONS TO FILE AND CONTEST LAWSUITS

Consider the case of a consumer who has purchased a defective ballpoint pen and who is in theory
entitled to a refund. Because the value of the pen is exceeded by even the most streamlined
judicial proceeding, the consumerÕs threat to litigate is not credible; and absent procedural
devices such as a class action that can allow aggregation of her claim with others, she will be
forced to rely on nonlegal incentives such as the sellerÕs interest in its reputation for
goodwill. If the consumer can recover legal fees along with the value of her refund, however,
her threat to sue becomes credible. Shavell (1982a), extending work of Landes (1971) and
Gould (1973) on the incentives to sue, generalized this argument to show that the English
rule, and indemnification in general, works to encourage lawsuits by plaintiffs with relatively
small claims but relatively high ex ante probabilities of victory. The American rule,

conversely, encourages plaintiffs with relatively large claims but lower probabilities of
victory.
The formal logic of the argument is as follows: let p represent the probability of a plaintiff

victory, A the expected award if the plaintiff wins, and c the cost of litigation for each
litigant. (To simplify the argument, suppose that this cost is the same for both sides; this
will affect the specific point at which the incentives switch, but not the basic intuition of
the argument.) Under the American rule, litigation is profitable if (and only if) pA > c;
thus, a plaintiff will bring suit if she views her chances at better than the threshold
probability pUS Žc/A. Under the English rule, however, the plaintiffÕs expected litigation
cost is not c but (1Ðp)2c, since she pays no costs if she wins but 2c if she loses. She will
accordingly wish to litigate if pA >(1Ðp)2c, or equivalently, if she views her chances at
better than pENG Ž 2c/(A+2c). Algebraic manipulation reveals that c>A/2 implies pUS >
pENG > _, and c<A/2 implies pUS < pENG < _. Thus, when costs are high or stakes low, the
English rule encourages some betterÐthanÐaverage suits that would be deterred under the
American rule; when costs are low or stakes high, the English discourages some worseÐ
thanÐaverage suits that would be brought under the American rule.
An identical line of argument shows the effect of indemnification on the incentives to defend
against a lawsuit once it has been brought. If it costs the defendant c to put up a defense

that will succeed with probability p, it is worthwhile to defend (rather than suffer a
default) only if the expected savings pA exceed the expected costs of litigation. Under the
American rule these expected costs are c, and under the English rule they are (1Ðp)2c.
The logic is as before; the American rule encourages longÐshot defenses in highÐstakes and
lowÐcost cases, while the English rule encourages highÐprobability defenses in highÐcost
and lowÐstakes cases.

Such arguments lend support to the frequently expressed view that the English rule is superior on
grounds of corrective justice, since the claims and defenses that it promotes are relatively
meritorious ones Ñ at least when viewed from an ex ante perspective. Similarly, as

Rosenberg and Shavell (1985) have shown, indemnification can help discourage certain
frivolous or ÒstrikeÓ suits, by emboldening defendants to put forward costly defenses
against them (assuming that the frivolous nature of the suit is common knowledge; as
Katz (1990) argues, the English rule may do little to discourage strike suits that cannot be
identified as such without a trial.)
But there is a cost to this ostensible increase in justice. The claim and defenses encouraged by the
English rule are lowÐstakes and highÐcost Ñ that is, expensive to try relative to their
importance. The claims and defenses encouraged by the American rule may be relative
longshots on the merits, but they are relatively cheap to resolve. Moreover, some suits,
including those brought to test or clarify the law or to settle matters of principle, may be
socially desirable notwithstanding a low ex ante probability of success. Accordingly, legal

policy in this area may present a tradeoff between justice and more narrow conceptions
of efficiency.
Any conclusions regarding the effect of litigation fee shifting on incentives to sue must also take
account of the litigantsÕ expected response to risk. As has been widely recognized, the
English rule magnifies the private risk arising from litigation by increasing both the returns
from success and the losses from defeat. Thus, it tends to discourage riskÐaverse parties from
bringing or defending lawsuits, regardless of the merits of their positions Ñ a factor that has
been stressed by partisans of the American rule. What has been less well recognized,
however, is that this same increase in variance can encourage more litigation by the riskÐ
neutral. The reason is that most lawsuits are divided into a series of procedural stages, at each
of which it is possible to decide whether to continue depending on how the case is going.
Because of this flexibility, as Cornell (1990) has shown, the decision to litigate can be
interpreted as the purchase of an option. Just as financial options can sell for a positive price
even if the probability of exercising them is low, the option value of litigation can make it
profitable to put forward claims with negative expected value. Because the value of an
option increases with its variance, the English rule, by increasing both the upside and the
downside of litigation, intensifies this incentive. Indeed, if parties can drop arguments before
trial without penalty, such enhanced option value could increase litigation even by the riskÐ
averse.
Additionally, as the previous section indicated, the English rule indirectly alters incentives to sue
through its effects on the expected cost of the individual case. Because indemnification
encourages parties to litigate their disputes more intensively, it increases the expected cost of
bringing and defending suits ex ante. This will deter parties on the margin of litigation from

pursuing their cases, whether they are on the margin because of low stakes, high cost, or
low probability. This effect is essentially analogous to a tax on litigation; as both Bowles
(1987) and Hause (1989) have observed, to the extent it is empirically significant it could
outweigh the effects described above. Unless such increased expenditures improve the
quality of judicial decisionmaking, however, they must be counted as a disadvantage of
the English rule. Even if it is deemed desirable to deter litigation by raising its private
cost, it is plainly more efficient to do so with a excise tax, which merely transfers wealth
from litigants to the public fisc, than by wasting real resources. The same objection
applies to any policy of deterring litigation through increased risk, which constitutes a
real loss for those on whom it is imposed.

I.

EFFECTS OF FEE SHIFTING ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LITIGATION

Because the great majority of civil cases are settled rather than tried, and because trial
substantially increases the cost of disputes, effects on settlement are a critical factor in any
comparison of the English and American rules. As a result, the economic literature on fee
shifting has focused on this issue more than any other. The conventional wisdom among
practicing attorneys appears to be that a shift toward fuller indemnification would encourage
settlement. The conclusions of the scholarly literature, however, cannot be said to offer
strong support for this proposition; at best the effects are ambiguous.
As a first approximation, fee shifting magnifies the effect of litigantsÕ optimism, making them
less likely to settle. As Landes (1971) and Gould (1973) observed, since litigation is a
negativeÐsum game ex post, parties who accurately assess their chances of victory have a

strong collective incentive to avoid the costs of trial. Indeed, in a world of purely Coasian
bargaining, there would be no trials at all, since full sharing of information would eliminate
any differences of opinion. Because of random variations in information, judgment, and
temperament, however, some fraction of litigants will inevitably overassess their chances;
and it is these optimistic litigants who have an incentive to go to trial. Pessimistic or
unbiased parties, in contrast, would prefer to settle. But the degree of optimism
necessary for a trial to result depends on how litigation costs are allocated, as the
following argument [suggested by Mause (1969) and formally demonstrated by Shavell
(1982a)] shows: Under the American rule, a plaintiff who perceives the probability of
liability as pP, her stakes as AP, and her costs as cP will insist on receiving a settlement of
no less than SP ŽpP AP Ð cP. Similarly, a defendant who perceives the probability of
liability as pD, his stakes as AD, and his costs as cD will be willing to pay no more than SD
ŽpD AD + cD. Settlement is thus possible if (and only if) SP < SD, or equivalently, if the
total litigation costs, cP + cD, exceed the difference between the partiesÕ reservation

settlement values, pPAP Ð pDAD. Parties whose litigation costs are below this cutoff level,
conversely, will prefer to go to trial. Under the English rule, however, the plaintiffÕs
reservation settlement value becomes SP ŽpP AP Ð (1ÐpP)(cP + cD), and the defendantÕs
becomes SD ŽpD (AD + cP + cD). Now settlement is possible only if cP + cD > (pP AP Ð pD
AD)/(1ÐpP+pD). If the plaintiffÕs probability estimate pP exceeds the defendantÕs
probability estimate pD, the partiesÕ reservation prices will diverge, making settlements
less likely.
The economic intuition underlying this result is that indemnification internalizes one externality
while creating another. Under the English rule, a litigant is forced to take into account the
other sideÕs litigation costs to the extent that she risks losing the case, making her more
willing to settle. But conversely, she is freed of her own litigation costs to the extent that
she hopes to win, making her less likely to settle. Since litigants are disproportionately
drawn from the population of optimists (else they would settle however costs are allocated),
the latter effect tends to outweigh the former. Indeed, in the limiting case when both parties
are fully confident of winning, neither expects to pay any costs at all and settlement is
impossible. This line of argument, however, suggests an important exception to the basic
result: in some cases, parties might choose to litigate due to a difference of opinion not over
liability but over stakes. A plaintiff who regarded the stakes as sufficiently higher than did
the defendant Ñ for example, because she hoped to establish a favorable precedent that could
be drawn on in later cases Ñ might refuse all settlements even if the parties agreed on the
probability of liability or were both relatively pessimistic. If the partiesÕ relative optimism
about the stakes were enough to outweigh their relative pessimism about probability, fee
shifting would encourage settlement and discourage trial.
The LandesÐGould model of settlement bargaining (often called the Òoptimism modelÓ in
subsequent literature) is open to the criticism that it is not rigorously grounded in the modern
theory of imperfect information games. In particular, it does not explain how the parties
can maintain their inconsistent perceptions of the case in the face of negotiation; and its
conclusion that nonoptimistic parties will always settle ignores the possibility of strategic
behavior and depends on the assumption of collective rather than individual rationality.
Accordingly, subsequent writers have often preferred to base their analyses on an alternative
bargaining model based on Bayesian inference and on the assumption of rational
expectations. In this model, due to Harsanyi and Selten (1972) and introduced into the lawÐ
andÐeconomics literature by Cooter, Marks, and Mnookin (1982), trials are caused not by
optimism but by uncertainty over the opponentÕs reservation settlement value. The logic is
that parties uncertain of their opponentsÕ bottom line will find it individually rational t o
balance the probability of settlement against its terms Ñ making offers that more combative
opponents will reject, in order to improve the return from settlements with those who are
more conciliatory, Whether cases settle, therefore, depends on a number of factors,

including the stakes, the cost of litigation, and, most importantly, the extent of uncertainty
between the parties. A high variance of reservation settlement values means that taking a
marginally tougher position sacrifices fewer bargains Ñ lowering the opportunity cost of hard
bargaining. More uncertainty thus means less settlement.
Despite their differences from the optimism model, however, Bayesian models of settlement [see,
e.g., Bebchuk (1984), Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Talley (1996)] tend to confirm its
conclusion that the English rule tends to discourage settlement in disputes revolving around
liability, though not in disputes revolving around stakes. The reason is that indemnification
magnifies uncertainty in the former set of cases but not in the latter. More precisely,
uncertainty about opponentsÕ reservation values can stem from numerous sources: variations
in the private cost and stakes of litigation, in attitudes toward risk and delay, and in private
information relevant to the trial outcome. Differences in risk aversion, time preference, and
stakes are not affected by fee shifting, but differences in private cost and in information
relevant to liability are. Fee shifting thus increases the difference between the reservation
values of parties with favorable private information and high litigation costs on one hand,
and parties with unfavorable information and low litigation costs on the other. This increase
in uncertainty leads all types of parties to toughen their overall bargaining positions, lowering
the probability of settlement. Ironically, as Polinsky and Rubinfeld (forthcoming 1997)
point out, this implies that the English rule actually lowers the average quality of tried cases,
since the marginal parties it sends to trial have relatively less favorable private information
than those who would litigate absent the prospect of indemnification.
The foregoing discussion of both optimism and Bayesian models, however, has assumed risk
neutrality and has taken the cost of litigation as given. As the previous sections have
observed, indemnification both increases the risks of litigation and raises litigation costs
generally. Both effects tend to encourage settlement, thus mitigating and perhaps
counteracting the effects of optimism and asymmetric information.
Whether
indemnification increases or decreases settlement on balance, accordingly, depends on the
relative magnitude of competing factors, and cannot be settled theoretically.
Even if fee shifting does not alter the probability of settlement, however, it can still influence its
amount. As Cooter and Rubinfeld (1994) have argued in the context of legal discovery and
Bebchuk and Chang (1996) have argued in the context of offers of judgment, fee shifting can,
by equalizing the bargaining power of parties with asymmetric litigation costs, help to move
the settlement amount closer to the expected trial outcome.
To the extent that trial
outcomes are deemed to be just, fee shifting thus may help promote equity; to the extent that
trial outcomes reflect substantive legal norms, fee shifting helps promote incentives for
proper primary behavior Ñ a subject more fully explored in the following section.

I.

EFFECTS OF FEE SHIFTING ON SUBSTANTIVE BEHAVIOR

The discussion thus far is in a fundamental sense incomplete, since it has focused largely on
the procedural costs of litigation. If such costs were oneÕs only concern, of course, they
could be eliminated entirely by abolishing the legal system and all publicly enforceable
rights
to
relief.
A
central
purpose

of having a public system of courts, however, is to redress wrongs and to encourage
compliance with primary substantive norms such as taking precautions against accidents
and keeping oneÕs promises. Indemnity of legal fees, accordingly, must ultimately be
judged on these latter criteria Ñ or more accurately, on whether it increases the social
value of substantive enforcement net of process costs.
Viewed from this perspective, the English rule initially appears attractive, since it tends t o
encourage high probability suits and discourage low probability ones. Assuming that the
probability of liability is correlated with the actual violation of substantive norms, therefore,
indemnification increases the net expected punishment for such violations and thus helps
promote substantive compliance. This is easily seen in the case where courtsÕ liability
determinations are errorÐfree, as RoseÐAckerman and Geistfeld (1987) and Polinsky and
Rubinfeld (1988) have shown. Consider a potential tortfeasor who can take precautions
against an accident that will cause an uncertain amount of damage. Suppose that the possible
damage ranges from zero to A, and that the cost of establishing liability following an

accident is c. Under the American rule, it follows that the tortfeasor will have inadequate
incentives for precaution. In the event that damages turn out to be less than c, the victim
will not sue, so the tortfeasor will escape responsibility for a portion of the damages
caused. Under the English rule, however, the victim will always have the incentive to sue,
so that all accident costs will be fully internalized. Under a rule of negligence as opposed
to strict liability, indeed, complete cost internalization can be achieved without incurring
any litigation costs at all: defendants will be induced to take optimal care by the threat of
litigation, so plaintiffs will never actually have to sue. Conversely, under the American
rule, defendants may rationally decide to take excess care Ñ or to abstain from risky
though optimal activities Ñ in order to avoid the greater expense of having to defend their
behavior in court. Indemnification protects them from such expenses, thus preventing
overdeterrence.
This happy outcome, however, depends on the assumption that deserving plaintiffs and
defendants always win their cases. In the presence of legal error, as PÕng (1987) and
Polinsky and Shavell (1989) have shown, neither the American nor the English rule provides
incentives that are firstÐbest optimal. Optimal incentives, rather, require at least two
separate policy instruments Ñ one to motivate efficient substantive behavior, and another to
promote an efficient amount of litigation. Polinsky and Che (1991) demonstrate that, in
general, this means decoupling the amounts paid by losing defendants from those received by
victorious plaintiffs. (Indeed, as Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1996) show, decoupling is generally
necessary even to achieve the lesser goal of minimizing the litigation costs associated with
achieving a given level of deterrence). Devices combining fines, punitive damages and taxes
(positive or negative) on litigation accomplish such decoupling, but the English rule, which
merely reÐallocates costs between the parties in zeroÐsum fashion, does not. Furthermore, it

is not even the case that the English rule is secondÐbest efficient within the category of
zeroÐsum policy instruments. Kaplow (1993) shows that damage multipliers, such as the
treble damage provisions of U.S. antitrust law, provide a cheaper method of achieving any
given amount of deterrence. The reason is that damage multipliers provide incentives for
private law enforcement to be undertaken by those plaintiffs whose litigation costs are
lowest; fee shifting, in contrast, encourages plaintiffs to bring lawsuits without regard to their
costs of litigation.
One might still ask whether the English rule does better than the American in promoting efficient
substantive behavior, notwithstanding the potential availability of alternatives that are
superior to both. The answer to this question, however, is ambiguous, as Gravelle (1993),
Hylton (1993a, 1993b), and Beckner and Katz (1995) demonstrate in independent formal
models. It is possible to draw generalizations regarding when the English rule improves
matters, but they depend on the subtle interaction of a number of factors, including whether
substantive precaution affects the magnitude of injury or just its probability, the extent t o
which precaution affects the probability of liability, whether damage awards are sufficient t o
compensate plaintiffs for their losses, and whether defendants have the opportunity to act
strategically by taking just enough care to foreclose litigation. Hylton, for instance,
concludes that a oneÐway fee shifting rule operating in favor of plaintiffs would be best, but
this conclusion depends upon several features of his model (including, perhaps most
importantly, the assumption that plaintiffÕs care does not affect the expected cost of
accidents). Applying such generalizations to individual cases or categories of cases is
probably beyond the capacity of either courts or legislatures. As Gravelle concludes, Ò[i]t
seems more promising to pursue other, more direct means of correcting the inefficient
incentives for care provided by a costly and imperfect legal system.Ó

I.

VARIATIONS ON SIMPLE FEE SHIFTING

The foregoing discussion has been premised on the assumption that Òcosts follow the eventÓ Ñ
that is, that any fee shifting that takes place is based solely on who wins the case. Much
recent discussion in policy and scholarly circles, however, has focused on two more
complicated forms of indemnification.

A.

Fee shifting conditioned on offers made in settlement

Both England and a number of American jurisdictions provide a mechanism through which a
defendant who would otherwise be obliged to pay for legal expenses can partially
avoid the obligation by making a suitable offer of settlement. In England this

procedure is called Òpayment into courtÓ and requires the defendant actually t o
deposit funds with a court officer; while in the United States, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68 and similar court rules merely require the formal filing of what is labeled
an Òoffer of judgment.Ó Under either provision, a defendant who makes such a
formal
offer
is
considered

the prevailing party for purposes of cost allocation if the plaintiff rejects the offer
and then is subsequently awarded a lesser amount at trial. In such event, the
defendant avoids having to pay any costs incurred by the plaintiff subsequent to the
offer, and is entitled to indemnification for his own subsequent costs as well. By all
accounts, defendants avail themselves of this procedure much more frequently in
England than in the U.S. Ñ probably because the prospect of shifting liability for
ÒcostsÓ is likelier under the broader English definition of the term to outweigh the
disadvantages of making a settlement offer. Similarly, within the U.S., Rule 68
appears to be used more widely in disputes covered by oneÐway proÐplaintiff fee
shifting statutes such as Title VII, since the Supreme Court held in Marek v. Chesny,

105 S.Ct. 3012 (1985), that attorneyÕs fees shifted under such statutes are to be
considered ÒcostsÓ under Rule 68.
Because of the relatively infrequent use of Rule 68 in U.S. courts, a number of American critics
have in recent years supported its expansion Ñ either by extending its coverage t o
attorneysÕ fees generally, or by making the procedure available to plaintiffs as well as
defendants. [It should be noted, however, that providing the procedure to plaintiffs is
meaningless to the extent that they are already entitled to collect costs when they
prevail; in such circumstances, the opportunity to make an offer of judgment can
only advantage defendants.] The recent GOP ÒContract with America,Ó for example,
would have established just such a generalized offerÐofÐjudgment rule in federal
diversity cases. Such proposals have commonly been supported by the claim that
they will reduce expenditures on litigation by encouraging parties to make more
reasonable settlement offers and to accept such offers when they are made. Their
proponents have also argued that it is fairer to charge the costs of trial to the party
who, by refusing a reasonable settlement, causes those costs to be incurred.
In general, the economic literature on offers of judgment is substantially less developed than that
on pure indemnification; and many interesting questions remain to be fully
investigated, including the effect of the procedure on strategic behavior in
negotiations. The place to begin any analysis of the offer of judgment, however, is
with the observation that it is essentially an option to convert disputes over damages
into disputes over liability. To see this, compare two cases: one in which it is clear
that the defendant has acted negligently but unclear whether the plaintiffÕs injuries
are 1000 or 3000 (with the two possibilities being equally likely), and a second in
which it is clear that damages are 4000, but an even gamble whether the defendant is
liable at all. In both cases, expected damages are 2000, but absent an offerÐofÐ
judgment procedure the plaintiffÕs position is stronger in the former. She is certain
to prevail at trial and to recover some fraction of her costs, even if it is only court
fees. In the latter case, she runs the risk of paying both her costs and a portion of

the defendantÕs. Under Rule 68 or a similar procedure, however, the defendant can
convert the former dispute into a partial settlement of 1000 combined with a dispute
over whether the defendant is liable for an additional 2000. In this converted dispute,
the defendant stands an even chance of avoiding liability for the plaintiffÕs costs and
of recovering his own. This improves his expected position to what it would be in
the case of pure liability, at the plaintiffÕs expense.
The example illustrates two lessons. First, a rule authorizing defendants but not plaintiffs to make
offers of judgment redistributes wealth from plaintiffs to defendants in disputes that
are entirely or partly over damages, as both Priest (1982) and Miller (1986) have
suggested. Second, such offers have no effect in disputes that are purely over liability.
If the only possible trial outcomes are verdicts of zero or 4000, for instance, there is
no advantage to the defendant in making a Rule 68 offer of less than the full 4000.
If he offers a lesser amount, he will be liable for costs in the event of a plaintiffÕs
verdict and certain to receive costs in the event of a defendantÕs verdict Ñ just as he
would if he made no offer at all. Similarly, a lessÐthanÐfull offer does not affect the
possible payoffs for the plaintiff. The defendant could of course offer to settle for
the full 4000, but the plaintiff should be happy to accept such an offer whether or
not Rule 68 is in force. The offerÐofÐjudgment procedure, accordingly, cannot affect
whether an offer is made or accepted in such cases.
With these points taken as caveats, the effects of offerÐofÐjudgment rules are roughly analogous
to those of indemnification in general. The possibility that costs will be shifted
following a settlement offer both raises the stakes of the case and lowers the
perceived marginal cost of legal expenditure, thus increasing incentives to expend
resources at trial. The effect is less than under the pure English rule, however, since
only postÐoffer expenditures are liable to be shifted. Similarly, the opportunity t o
make an offer of judgment increases expected payoffs for plaintiffs who expect t o
win large awards at trial, and lowers expected payouts of defendants who expect
awards to be low, emboldening such parties to pursue litigation.
The effect of offers of judgment on the settlement decision depends, like the effect of
indemnification generally, on the partiesÕ attitudes toward risk and on the model of
settlement that one thinks appropriate. Under the LandesÐPosnerÐGould optimism
model, offers of judgment tends to lower the chances of settlement between riskÐ
neutral parties, since, as Priest (1982) suggests and Miller (1986) and Chung (1996)
confirm, such offers lower the reservation values of optimistic defendants more than
they do those of optimistic plaintiffs, thus reducing the potential settlement range.
Offers of judgment also increase the risk of litigation, though not as much as pure
indemnification does; this encourages riskÐaverse parties to settle, but riskÐpreferring

parties to litigate. Anderson (1994), who extends the optimism model to include the
possibility of bargaining stalemate, reaches similar results. Within Bayesian models
of settlement, the outcome appears more complicated. Cooter, Marks and Mnookin
(1982) conjecture that an offerÐofÐjudgment rule, by effectively taxing hard offers
and subsidizing soft ones, should encourage settlement. Spier (1994), however, in a
model in which defendants make offers to plaintiffs with private information, finds
that the procedure leads to more settlement than the pure American rule in cases
where the plaintiffÕs private information relates solely to the size of the award, less
settlement than the American rule in cases where the plaintiffÕs private information
relates solely to the probability of liability, and an ambiguous effect in other cases.
She also demonstrates a similar result using a mechanismÐdesign model that, instead
of specifying any particular bargaining process, assumes that the parties use a ParetoÐ
efficient trading mechanism in the style of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). As
with pure indemnification, accordingly, the effect of offers of judgment on
settlement probabilities appears to depend on the sources of the underlying dispute.

A.

Fee shifting conditioned on the margin of victory
In the United States, a variety of statutory and judicially created rules allow
courts to award partial or full indemnification in lawsuits in which the losing
partyÕs case is deemed after the fact to be of sufficiently low merit. Such rules
include the commonÐlaw torts of barratry, abuse of process, and malicious
prosecution, the traditional authority of courts of equity to exercise their
discretion in the interests of justice, the sanctions for discovery abuse provided by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, and the (just amended) provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code requiring the government to pay a taxpayerÕs reasonable
litigation costs upon a court finding that the governmentÕs position in a tax
dispute was substantially unjustified. Similarly, as Pfennigstorf (1984) reports,
indemnification awards in most other Western legal systems are likely to be more
generous in cases where the loserÕs legal or factual position appears weak.
The possibility of tying indemnification to the merits of the losing case has
attracted increased attention in recent years, in part as a response to the growth of
litigation practice under U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. This rule
requires persons filing court papers to warrant that their filings are well grounded,
and authorizes courts to impose monetary sanctions on parties whose filings are
found to be frivolous, harassing, or made for purposes of delay. Limiting fee
shifting to cases of particularly low merit has seemed to many commentators an
attractive compromise between the English and American rules, since it protects

clearly deserving litigants without imposing unnecessary risk on those who bring
colorable claims in good faith.
As Bebchuk and Chang (1996) have pointed out, the effect of policies such as
Rule 11 is to condition fee shifting on the winnerÕs margin of victory; those who
win in a rout receive indemnification, while those who win narrowly do not. They
confirm the conventional wisdom in a formal model, showing that such policies, if
designed properly, can do a better job than either the English or the American rule
at encouraging meritorious suits (and by analogy, defenses) and discouraging
frivolous ones. The reason is that such policies make use of the partiesÕ private ex
ante information regarding the merits of the case. A party who loses by a large
margin is less likely to have believed ex ante that her case had merit; conversely,
one who wins by a large margin is less likely to have believed that her case lacked
merit. While the optimal fee shifting rule depends on the distribution of judicial
and litigant error, it is possible by altering the threshold for fee shifting to regulate
the proportion of potential claims and defenses that are actually brought into the
system. Because its effects are zeroÐsum, however, marginÐbased fee shifting is
still less efficient than policies that decouple one sideÕs payments from the other
sideÕs recovery (see generally Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 1993). Policies that tax or
subsidize individual parties based on the ex post quality of their case may be best
of all; they may also, of course, be the most difficult to administer.
While other incentive effects of marginÐbased fee shifting have not been formally
explored, it appears likely that it has analogous consequences to indemnification
generally, though in lesser degree. These consequences recapitulate the discussion
in earlier sections of this article and can be surveyed in brief. First, to the extent
that such policies succeed in encouraging meritorious claims and defenses and
discouraging frivolous ones, they will tend to improve incentives for primary
substantive behavior. The complications described in section 6, supra, however,
remain to be analyzed. It is possible, for instance, that the prospect of shifting
litigation costs to the other side following a commanding victory will induce
excessive caretaking ex ante, though the benefits of doing so are less than under the
pure English rule.
Second, marginÐbased fee shifting will both raise the stakes of litigation and
decrease its expected marginal cost, inducing the parties to intensify their efforts
at trial. Schmalbeck and Myers (1986) argue that this effect will be relatively
minor, since in a truly frivolous case there is little that the parties can do to change
the outcome. Their argument is open to question, however, as the substantial
amount of litigation effort under Rule 11 illustrates (see, e.g., Kobyashi and

Parker, 1993, who discuss the incentive effects of recent amendments intended to
reduce such ÒsatelliteÓ litigation.) While marginÐbased indemnification has little
effect on cases that are clearly contestable or clearly frivolous, in many disputes
the colorability of the losing case is less obvious. Parties in such intermediate
cases, thus, will have an incentive to increase their expenditures in order to
influence the size of the margin of victory.
Third, marginÐbased fee shifting will decrease the likelihood of settlement to the
extent that the parties have a difference of opinion regarding the chances of
indemnification. Optimistic parties will exaggerate the likelihood that they will
win by a large margin and underestimate the likelihood that they will lose by a
large margin. The prospect of indemnification will cause such parties to toughen
their settlement demands, reducing the range for settlement. Since pessimistic and
unbiased parties will have an incentive to settle in any event, the net consequence
will be an increase in trials. Similarly, given private information regarding the
probability of a oneÐsided outcome, marginÐbased fee shifting will increase the
variance of the partiesÕ reservation settlement values, encouraging tougher
bargaining and hence fewer settlements. The increased risk of trial, however,
works to counteract such effects for riskÐaverse litigants.
In sum, however, the case for at least some marginÐbased fee shifting appears
stronger than the case for indemnification generally, on grounds of both fairness
and efficiency. Parties who lose lawsuits decisively are probably more deserving
of sanction than those who lose barely. The social value of litigation is probably
higher in close cases, whether measured by the public benefits of legal precedent
or by more libertarian considerations. And marginÐbased fee shifting seems to do
a better job at providing improved incentives for primary behavior, and has lower
costs in terms of incentives for increased expenditure at trial. In light of the
relatively limited theoretical and empirical work on this particular topic, however,
these conclusions must be regarded as tentative.

I.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF FEE SHIFTING

Given the complexity and ambiguity of the aforementioned considerations, it would plainly be
desirable to have some hard empirical evidence to bring to the policy debate.
Unfortunately, such evidence is sparse. Critics of the American rule commonly point
to the larger numbers of disputes and higher expenditures on litigation in the U.S. t o
support their case for reform. But such a crude comparison does not seem especially

fruitful in light of the many other significant features that distinguish the American
legal system from its counterparts in other Western countries, including economic
and demographic factors, differences in substantive rights, procedural practice, the
structure of courts and the legal profession, the availability of other financing
arrangements such as the contingent fee and prepaid legal services, a high degree of
rightsÐconsciousness among individual citizens, and the absence of a comprehensive
program of social insurance that would help to channel demands for compensatory
relief away from the private legal system.
The proper question to ask, therefore, is what effect fee shifting has on litigation expenditures
and primary behavior, holding constant other features of the legal environment. But
again, answers to this question are hard to come by. Although the U.S. legal system
contains a number of pockets of indemnification, these examples have for the most
part escaped systematic quantitative inquiry. The evidence on fee shifting, rather,
falls into three categories: laboratory research on bargaining behavior by
experimental subjects, numerical simulations of litigation behavior based on
empirically obtained parameters, and econometric evidence primarily drawn from a
single policy experiment: FloridaÕs experience with the English rule in medical
malpractice cases from 1980 through 1985.

A.

Laboratory experiments

Coursey and Stanley (1988) tested the effects of fee shifting within an experimental setting they
designed to simulate the process of bargaining under threat of trial. They divided
their subjects (students at the University of Wyoming) into pairs and instructed them
to attempt to divide between themselves a number of tokens that were subsequently
convertible into cash. If time expired before the subjects reached agreement, the
tokens were divided through a random drawing, intended to represent an uncertain
court award. To simulate rational expectations, the subjects were presented with the
probability distribution of awards arising from the random drawing, and to simulate
the costs of trial, the subjects were collectively fined an amount equaling 40% of the
total value of the tokens in the event the drawing had to take place.
The experimenters conducted negotiations using three different cost allocation rules. Under the
simplest procedure, the fine was divided between the two parties equally, in an
intended simulation of the American rule. A second group of subjects negotiated
under a rule whereby the fine was paid entirely by the party who received the smaller
portion of the token in a random drawing; this was intended to simulate the English
rule. Yet a third group negotiated under an offerÐofÐjudgment rule intended t o
simulate Rule 68: the plaintiff paid the entire fine if the draw awarded her an amount

less than or equal to the defendantÕs last proposal; and the fine was otherwise split
equally.
The result of this experiment were that subjects settled more frequently under the English than
under the American rule. Under Rule 68 settlement was likeliest of all; and in
addition the plaintiff was much more likely to be the accepting party. The authors
also found that settlements were more favorable to the defendant under Rule 68 than
under the English rule, consistent with the theoretical predictions outlined in the
previous section. The American rule was most favorable of all for the defendant,
though the authors ascribed this result to the behavior of one especially riskÐaverse
individual. These findings are consistent with theoretical models that predict
increased settlement on the basis of simple risk aversion. Because the experimental
design ruled out the possibility of optimism or private information, however, its
results cannot be extrapolated to situations in which such phenomena, which could
cause the English rule to reduce settlement, are present.
In a separate series of survey experiments, Rowe and various coÐauthors studied the effects of cost
allocation rules on lawyersÕ and law studentsÕ responses to a variety of bargaining
situations presented by hypothetical tort and civil rights cases. While this
experimental design suffered from the weakness that the subjects were not provided
with any direct financial incentives, the more realistic nature of the problems and the
subjectsÕ professional status and experience provided at least some motivation t o
bargain seriously. The results of the experiments, however, were mixed. Rowe and
Vidmar (1988) found that there was little difference between the American rule and
an modified Rule 68 (enhanced to cover attorneysÕ fees and to allow plaintiffs as well
as defendants to make offers) on law studentsÕ willingness to accept offers of
settlement, although they did find an effect on the size of counteroffers as well as a
difference in plaintiff acceptance rates between modified Rule 68 and a oneÐway proÐ
plaintiff rule. Anderson and Rowe (1996) replicated this experiment with practicing
lawyers, also examining the subjectsÕ behavior under an alternative fee shifting rule in
which the maker of a rejected offer had to pay the rejecting partyÕs subsequent
reasonable attorneysÕ fees. They found that while modified Rule 68 did not
appreciably affect plaintiffsÕ minimum asks relative to the American rule, it did raise
the maximum amounts that defendants were willing to offer. Finally, Rowe and
Anderson (1996) considered the effects of a modified rule 68 on hypothetical
bargaining in civil rights cases otherwise governed by a proÐplaintiff rule. They
found that replacing this oneÐway rule with an enhanced Rule 68 significantly lowered
plaintiffsÕ minimum asks, as well as the gap between plaintiff asks and defendant
offers. In all, these results suggest that fee shifting has its strongest effect when it is
oneÐsided and when the favored side is risk averse or liquidity constrained.

A.

Simulations

A number of authors have attempted to estimate the quantitative effects of fee shifting by
numerically simulating the behavior of theoretical models. KatzÕs (1987)
approach is illustrative. He developed algebraic formulas, based on a linear
approximation to the standard model of litigation expenditure, that relate the
difference in expenditure per case between the English and American rules to two
empirical parameters: the ratio of total expenditure to the stakes of the case, and
the elasticity with which parties increase their expenditures in response to higher
stakes. Using empirical estimates of these parameters taken from the University
of WisconsinÕs Civil Litigation Research Project (Trubek et al. 1983), he calculated
the likely effects of switching from the American to the English rule, concluding
that such a switch would increase expenditures per case in the neighborhood of
125%.
Such a large increase in cost per case, however, could be expected to lead to a reduction in the
number of cases or to increased settlement. In an attempt to measure this anticipated
reduction, Hause (1989) extended the LandesÐGould optimism model to allow for
variable expenditure, and calculated its numerical behavior for a range of possible
parameter values. He concluded that the increased costs per case under the English
rule were sufficient to outweigh any effects of optimism, resulting on balance in an
increased frequency of settlement. Hersch (1990) recalculated HauseÕs simulations
under the assumption that trial expenditure is determined in a conjecturalÐvariations
rather than a Nash equilibrium. He found that both settlement and costs per case
rose, though by a lesser amount than Hause had estimated. The parameter values
Hause and Hersch used, however, were not based on any empirical data. Donohue
(1991a) recalculated HauseÕs simulations using what he argued were more plausible
parameter estimates, and concluded that the English rule would increase trials on
balance.
Finally, Hylton (1993a, 1993b) used numerical simulation to estimate the effects of fee shifting
on primary behavior. He concludes that while litigation is more frequent under the
English than the American rule, levels of substantive compliance under the two rules
would be similar. Best of all, according to his calculations, is oneÐway proÐplaintiff
fee shifting, which leads to the highest level of compliance and least amount of
litigation. These conclusions, however, depend both on the functional form used in
his simulations, and on the specific assumptions of his theoretical model.

A.

Econometric evidence of actual disputes

The statistical and econometric evidence on fee shifting, as well as on litigation and
settlement more generally, has unfortunately been rather limited. Schwab and
Eisenberg (1988) report on a 1976 statute that established oneÐway proÐplaintiff
fee shifting in federal constitutional tort cases (i.e., cases in which where the
federal government is sued for violating the plaintiffÕs constitutional rights.) They
find some evidence that the statute was followed by a decline in plaintiff success
rates at trial and by an increase in trials relative to other federal civil actions, but
little evidence of any increase in the number of lawsuits filed. These results
suggest that the statute had its primary effect in encouraging plaintiffs to bargain
more aggressively in settlement negotiations, consistent with Rowe et al.Õs survey
experiments as well as with the theoretical predictions of the optimism and
Bayesian settlement models discussed in section 5 above. Because of the
relatively low magnitude of their quantitative estimates, however, and because
their observations were muddied by the fact that some courts shifted fees on a
discretionary basis before the statute was passed, the authors present their
findings as tentative.
Fournier and Zuehlke (1989) develop an econometric model of settlement
behavior in which the plaintiffÕs settlement demand and the probability of
settlement are jointly determined. Using nonlinear methods that correct for data
censoring (i.e., the fact that the amount of the demand is only observed when
settlement takes place), they estimate their model using data from a nationwide
survey of civil federal filings between 1979 and 1981. The data classifies disputes
according to the type of legal claim at issue (e.g., tort, copyright, antitrust) and
includes information regarding the alleged damages and the number of litigants in
each case, the mean and variance of trial awards in litigated cases within each
subjectÐmatter classification, and separately prepared estimates of government
litigation costs in each case classification, which the authors argue serve as a
reasonable proxy for private litigation costs. The coefficients of the resulting
equations suggest, not surprisingly, that settlement demands are positively
correlated with mean trial awards and alleged damages, and negatively correlated
with litigation costs. More interestingly, they also suggest that settlement is more
likely in cases and categories with high alleged damages, high mean and variance of
trial awards, multiple parties, and low (!) litigation costs. These latter results are
at odds with the theoretical predictions of most models of settlement, although the
negative relationship between settlement and potential trial awards is consistent
with a hypothesis of risk aversion.
Because a fraction of the sampled filings were subject to the English rule, Fournier
and Zuehlke were able to estimate its effects as well. They find that fee shifting is

negatively correlated with both the probability of settlement and the size of the
settlement demand, although the latter effect is not statistically significant. This
finding lends some support to the predictions of both the optimism and Bayesian
models. The filings in their sample governed by the English rule, however, were
few in number and concentrated in a few specialized areas, so this evidence cannot
be regarded as especially strong. It is possible that this correlation reflects
differences in the types of disputes covered by the rule, rather than effects of
indemnification. The authorsÕ unusual findings regarding the other determinants of
settlement also call this result into question.
More instructive is HughesÕ and SnyderÕs research on FloridaÕs experiment with
the English rule in medical malpractice cases. The Florida statute, passed in 1980
with the support of the state medical association, also provided an offerÐofÐ
judgment procedure and exempted insolvent parties from the obligation to pay
indemnification; it was repealed in 1985 with the support of its original
proponents following a series of expensive and wellÐpublicized plaintiff verdicts.
In Snyder and Hughes (1990), the authors use a bivariate probit procedure to
analyze insurance company data on closed claims filed before, during, and after the
period in which the rule was in effect, and estimate the effects of indemnification
on plaintiffsÕ decisions to drop claims, settlement, and defendantsÕ expenditure on
lawyers. Their findings lend support to several of the theoretical predictions
outlined in previous sections of this article. Specifically, they find that in cases
governed by the English rule, (1) a significantly higher percentage of claims were
dropped at an early stage of the litigation, consistent with the proposition that fee
shifting encourages riskÐaverse and low probability plaintiffs to exit the system;
(2) defendants spent significantly more per case, in amounts consistent with
KatzÕs simulations, in both settled and in litigated cases; (3) holding other case
characteristics constant, the likelihood of litigation increased, consistent with the
optimism model. Because dropped cases tended disproportionately to have
characteristics that would have made them likelier to go to trial had they remained
in the system, however, the authors conclude that the English rule decreased the
frequency of litigation on balance. Because of greater expenditure per case,
however, total expenditures on litigation still increased.
In a subsequent article analyzing the same data set [Hughes and Snyder (1995)],
the authors find that the English rule was associated with an increased frequency
of plaintiff success rates at trial, increased jury awards, and larger outÐofÐcourt
settlements. These increases were significant not just statistically but in absolute
terms; for instance, the average judgment in litigated cases increased from $25,190
in cases governed by the American rule to $69,390 in cases governed by the

English rule. These results appear to be driven by the case selection effects
detailed in the first article. The authors suggest that their results vindicate the
proposition that indemnification improves the quality of claims brought, although
they admit the possibility of an alternative explanation that lowÐdamage cases are
merely being driven away by the higher costs of litigation. They conclude that
fee shifting, contrary to the assertions of some legal practitioners, is not
necessarily an antiplaintiff policy. Rather, it benefits plaintiffs with highÐquality
or highÐdamage claims at the expense of those with lowÐquality or lowÐdamage
claims, and possibly at the expense of defendants. These conclusions, if valid,
would explain why the financial advantages expected by the Florida statuteÕs
original proponents did not appear to materialize; they would also suggest that the
statute improved the deterrent effect of civil liability. Whether such an
improvement would be worth the increased litigation expenditures it occasioned,
however, and whether it would be replicated in other areas of law with different
substantive and procedural characteristics from medical malpractice, remain open
questions.

I.

C ONCLUSION

It is worth mentioning two relatively underinvestigated aspects of fee shifting, the first of which is
its interaction with attorney/client fee contracts. U.S. practice is unusual not only in its
allocation of costs between plaintiff and defendant, but also in its tolerance of a variety of
costÐsharing arrangements between attorney and client, including the contingent fee, which is
widely used by tort plaintiffs. While an analysis of the contingent fee is beyond the scope of
this article, it is apparent that many of the incentive effects of fee shifting would be altered
in its presence. To give just one obvious example, any deterrent effect of indemnification on
riskÐaverse litigants may be substantially lessened in the presence of contingent fees, since it
may be possible to shift some of the increased risk from indemnification to the attorney
through adjustments in the contingency arrangement. For another example, the effect of
indemnification on trial expenditures may be different under contingent than under hourly
fees, since under the former arrangement the attorneyÕs incentives to devote time to the case
are dependent on the trial outcome, while under the latter they are independent. Halpern and
Turnbull (1983) discuss some of the incentives of contingent fee contracts under both the
English and American rules, and Dewees, Prichard and Trebilcock (1981) analyze some of the
additional complications that can arise in class actions, but neither article explicitly focuses
on the effects of indemnification. Donohue (1991b) discusses the combined effect of the
English rule and contingent fees, but his analysis is limited to effects on the settlement range
within the optimism model of settlement, and he presents only numerical examples based on

a few parameter values. A systematic analysis of the effects of fee shifting under contingent
fee contracts, accordingly, remains to be undertaken.
Second, it would be useful to know more about the effects of the English rule on incentives for
investigation prior to the onset of litigation. One commonly cited advantage of fee shifting
is that, by increasing the penalty for losing at trial, it encourages potential litigants to spend
more resources investigating the merits of their claims before officially entering the legal
system. This claim is plausible, but the developing economic literature on preÐtrial
investigation has not yet formally addressed it. While it is possible that this effect could help
to make the English rule more efficient than the American, such a conclusion turns on a
number of unknown propositions, including whether litigantsÕ investigative incentives are
currently adequate, and whether, given the availability of civil discovery, it is cheaper for
investigation to take place before rather than after a lawsuit has been filed.
All in all, despite the substantial scholarly and popular attention that the question of indemnity
for legal fees has attracted, the number of robust conclusions that can be drawn regarding its
consequences are few. Fee shifting does appear to increase legal expenditures per case, in
some cases significantly. It also encourages parties with poorly grounded legal claims t o
settle or to avoid litigating them in the first place, and has a similar effect on litigants who
are averse to risk, regardless of the merits of their cases. Aside from these generalizations,
most of the other propositions commonly asserted about fee shifting can neither be verified
nor rejected. It is unclear whether fee shifting increases the likelihood of settlement, whether
it decreases total expenditures on litigation or total payouts by defendants, or whether it on
balance improves incentives for primary behavior. It is even unclear whether fee shifting
makes it easier for parties with small meritorious claims to obtain compensation, in light of
the increased costs per case that it induces. In this regard, the relative lack of systematic
empirical investigation of these questions is particularly lamentable.
In light of this state of affairs, and in light of the numerous theoretical demonstrations that fee
shifting is a less effective way to promote optimal behavior than other available procedural
devices such as decoupling or damage multipliers, one is tempted to conclude that the amount
of scholarly attention directed to this topic exceeds its actual social importance. The
continued popular and political interest in fee shifting rules, however, makes this conclusion
problematic. While some support for fee shifting arises from its relative simplicity and its
status as the international majority rule, much of its continued appeal undoubtedly stems
from its association with deeply held notions of corrective justice Ñ and specifically, from
the idea that a party who is determined ex post to be in the right should be made financially

whole. Counterarguments based on economic efficiency, or indeed on any ex ante
perspective, can never entirely rebut this simple yet powerful intuition.

Whether the English rule is more just than the American rule, or whether its greater fairness
justifies its incentive properties, cannot be settled by lawyers or economists alone. The
citizenry as a whole must decide whether the principle of full compensation for victorious
litigants outweighs the procedural values of providing citizens with an open forum for
grievances and an opportunity to be heard, the uncertainty imposed on those who cannot
predict the outcome of court decisions, and the political implications of regulating legal
fees through a system of bureaucratic oversight rather than through private contract
between attorney and client. Moreover, as Prichard (1988) and Hylton (1996) have
observed, rules of cost allocation feed back through the selection of cases to influence the
development of other areas of substantive and procedural law. Rules that encourage
parties to raise relatively innovative claims and defenses help to break down precedent,
while rules that penalize riskÐtaking and novel arguments help to preserve traditional
formal categories. Given the pervasive influence of ostensibly procedural rules on
substantive outcomes, it may not be possible to separate the policy of fee shifting from
deeper questions of what the law should be.
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